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Chapter Two: The Transition
On October 5, 1988 a national referendum was held in Chile to decide if the ruling
military regime of Augusto Pinochet would be extended yet another eight years. Young and old
alike filled the street distributing pamphlets with voting directions and information; flyers papers
all over Santiago read “NO,” a reference to the vote against Pinochet. Not only did those
publicizing the referendum have to work against a confusing ballot where a negative answer
meant a positive outcome, but they also had to convince citizens that they wouldn’t be subject to
terrorism and intimidation by the government when they showed up at the polls. Yet, despite the
uphill battle, the NO campaign won with a 53% vote.1 Not quite ready to lose the long game,
Pinochet met with other members of the junta to discuss the action they might take in response to
the vote. According to reports, it was in this meeting on the evening of the plebiscite that he
suggested a violent overthrow of the vote and a reinstatement of the coup.2 However, with
growing pressure from international powers due to the many human rights violations published
by the Vicaria de Solidaridad, as well as this standing promise of a fair election, members of the
junta turned against Pinochet’s plan to violently retain power. The referendum had been allowed,
and thus it had to be followed through. Over the course of the next year, Augusto Pinochet and
his military dictatorship would be phased out of the Chilean government. For the first time in
fifteen years, the Chilean people would be allowed to elect their leader. For many, this was the
beginning of an era free of repression, a restoration of agency and community in the absence of
terror. For the Chilean Catholic Church, however, this was a moment of crisis. Political
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liberation also meant social liberation, and combined with the legacy of the Vicaria de
Solidaridad’s ability to create resistance within institutions themselves, leaders in the Church
began to fear they would lose their hold on the Chilean people. As a reaction to the changing
political landscape, conservative Church leaders began the transitioning the structural makeup of
the Church, putting the spiritual and political power back into the hands of the clergy.
This chapter’s focus is on this moment of change. In covering the cruelty of the military
junta, and the Church’s resistance as a response, we have established the stakes of this political
moment as one of deep emotion for the Chilean people. In order to know and explore this
emotion, it is important to understand the mechanisms behind the change itself. This chapter will
address historiography and various academic readings of this transition, as well as trace the
actions of main players and the broader nature of Chile in the nineties. The main argument calls
into question the motives of Church leaders and ties it to the consequences of their actions. The
active and successful resistance of the Catholic Church in Chile through the Vicaria, and the
increased presence of liberation theology in Latin America, created an imminent threat to the
hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church. Where leftist ideologies promoted communitybased organizing and solidarity, the Catholic Church pushed hierarchy and religious obedience.
The ability of the Chilean Church to occupy the role of religious leadership while also providing
aid and sanctuary against a conservative military regime placed them in a precarious position
with various Church leaders. Even if the Chilean Church itself was not a leftist political force,
their opposition to Pinochet’s repression as well as the human rights violations generally
disregarded by the Vatican made them a thorn in the side of both parties. However, there was no
doubt that the work of the Vicaria was indeed beneficial for the public image of the Vatican, and
thus rejecting it or even attempting to close it down under the regime would have incited
international chastisement; Pinochet knew this as well as the conservative forces in the Church.
Instead, the strategic move was to await the re-introduction of democracy to Chile, and then
declare the Vicaria and its community counterparts unnecessary to the development of a healthy
democracy.
Academic coverage of this historic moment is ample, however there are various readings
and arguments as to why and how this transition of political and religious power occurred. Liesl
Haas authored a chapter entitled “The Catholic Church in Chile: New Political Alliances” in the
collection Latin American Religion in Motion. In this chapter she identifies the end of the
dictatorship as a time of crisis for the Catholic Church and acknowledges the subsequent switch
from progressive human rights advocacy to conservative preoccupation with social morals. Since
the Catholic Church has historically held socially conservative views around abortion, marriage,
and so on, the post-dictatorship era switched their concern from human rights to keeping hold of
the morality of their diocese.3 As a result, many of the homilies and teachings turned from
encouraging community solidarity to upholding many right-wing political perspectives.
According to Haas, the Church didn’t necessarily lose those social views when the coup occurred
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in 1973, they just became a second priority to the defense of human rights. While much of Haas’
interpretation follows through with historical analysis, her implication that the foundation of the
Church remained unchanged fails to acknowledge the historical context of liberation theology, as
well as the dissolution of the Vicaria de Solidaridad. To view the changing political alignment of
the Church as “ironic” in light of its progressive history, and to see these changes as secondary
factors to a preoccupation with social morals, is to ultimately overlook the legacy of the Catholic
Church’s engagement and interest in maintaining political power.4 There was indeed a concern
over a newly realized social liberation, and this no doubt contributed to the Church’s turnover,
but it was a revival. Pope John Paul II’s papacy was famous for its desire to reestablish Church
power in hierarchy, and Chile’s Church seized the end of the dictatorship as a time to fall in line
with the Pope’s new agenda.5 The end of dictatorship coincided with the end of the Cold War,
and the Catholic Church was doing its best to move away from this era of progressive religious
rhetoric.
Cristian Parker puts forth a similar argument in his chapter on religion and culture in
Chile in the Nineties. For Parker, “Democracy proposed not only the transformation of the State,
but also the liberalization of culture.”6 This, he argues, was a catalyst for the Catholic Church to
increase their hold over the social and moral aspects of religious life. Like Haas, Parker excludes
that the Church was already beginning to tighten controls under Fresno’s leadership, and that
liberation theology’s prevalence under the regime directly threatened the hierarchical control of
the Church. The Church certainly made its public statements for a return to social conservatism
in relation to the liberal promises of democracy, however their previous actions and organizing
away from the laity made it clear this change had ulterior motivations. Another argument that
Parker puts forth, which is a common framing, is that the decrease of religious importance in
daily life was a result of democracy itself.7 This argument posits democracy as a modern form of
governance, and so with modernity comes a decreased interest, or loyalty, to religion. This
argument requires too many assumptions to be taken as historically viable. It assumes that
democracy is the highest evolved form of government, and additionally that religion fills some
primitive function in a distraught society. It also assumes that progress happens linearly; that
today we are more progressed than our ancestors before us. However, there is no high or evolved
form of society, and such an assumption is Western-centric thought. It is also incredibly
condescending to assume that religion is a need that melts away once modernity, which remains
undefined by Parker, presents itself. Besides the broader historical problems of Parker’s
argument, in the Chilean context it also overlooks the actions of the Church. The decision of the
Church to push towards conservatism in order to retake its stronghold on Chilean society had a
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direct impact on religious participation. By attempting to negotiate with the regime, taking more
conservative positions on social organizing, and eventually dissolving the Vicaria de Solidaridad,
the Church effectively alienated the majority of its base. The consequences of these actions can
be seen to develop slowly over time, as different communities filtered out religion from their
lives once it became clear the Church no longer represented them in their poverty and struggle.
Thus, the documented decrease of religious participation in Chilean society at the end of the
twentieth century was a direct result of the Church’s actions, and not a consequence of the
introduction of democracy.
Michael Fleet and Brian Smith’s research confirms the decrease of Catholic participation,
but also delves into the personal and political outlooks of Chileans in order to assess their
motivations in turning away from the Church. They argue that the institutional Church had great
impact and influence over the transition into democracy, but members of the Church did not.
They also acknowledge that such a transition began much earlier than the 1988 plebiscite,
especially for the Church.8 When looking into changing ideology in Chile, they surveyed
Chileans and recorded their political affiliations and opinions regarding the government. They
found that most low-income members of the Church, especially those involved in activism, had
progressive views, though not excessively left. However, they point out “the openness of these
low-income Catholics to collaboration with Marxists and to a political regime in which
Christians and Marxists could work together permanently is worth noting.”9 This is relevant as
later they discuss how many of these grassroots organizers, once deeply involved in liberation
theological methods to resist the regime, felt excluded from the Church as it phased out social
and political organizing from its interests and structure. This, Fleet and Smith argue in
conjunction with this thesis, was the result of Church actions that had been brewing for a decade.
“Two additional developments worth noting in connection with the local Church were
carried out shortly after Msgr. Oviedo became archbishop of Santiago. The first was the
formal dissolution, in March 1990, of the Coordinating Council of Christian
Communities that brought together politically oriented Catholic activists during the years
of transition. The second was the dismantling of the Vicaria de Solidaridad, in November
1991. In both cases, conservative bishops succeeded in getting rid of organizations that
had troubled them in the past. Without having to call their activities or their political
impact into question, they could point to the availability of secular agencies or outlets
capable of carrying them on in the post military period. In doing so, they denied the
Catholic activists in these organizations at least some of the respectability that their
Church ties lent them.”10
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This quote acknowledges the inner workings and political decisions the Church made without the
consent of its members. By purposefully changing the way the Church functioned in order to
restore hierarchical structure, Church leaders effectively alienated the base which had so actively
participated during the regime. Diminished membership and deteriorating leadership were
perhaps not consequences which the Church had foreseen, but they were nevertheless the results
of cutting off the support and community organizing of the majority of its members.
In addition to the changing religious landscape, the Church had also given little protest to
Pinochet’s introduction of neoliberalism to the economy.11 The advent of democracy only
strengthened this economic framework, supported by the United States after the fall of the
USSR. This economy had, and continues to have, very little positive impact on the majority of
Chileans. Large swathes of low-income Chileans were targeted by the regime, and so turned to
the Church with their own progressive politics as a place of safety and resistance to oppression.
When capitalist policies were a part of Pinochet’s regime, they were also a part of what was
being resisted. However, when these policies were pulled through into the era of democracy, it
became much more difficult to resist what continued to be unjust economic frameworks. Many
were exhausted from nearly two decades of advocacy and protest, and with no institutional
support from the Church, it became an increasingly uphill battle. José Cademartori, the minister
of economics under the Allende administration, makes a study of the neoliberal structure of
Chile in the 1990’s, arguing against the view of the 90’s as some kind of “golden era” for
economics. He writes, “There has been a loss of confidence in the free market because the
benefits of ‘modernity’ have been concentrated in a small minority who enjoy First World
standards of living while the general population remains firmly ensconced in the Third World.”12
He notes that this model has left the majority of Chileans as “defenseless” and forced to
“sacrifice [them]selves for the sake of maintaining the system.”13 Fleet and Smith corroborate
this view, writing “Chile’s transition to democracy was not a categorical victory for the
opposition. Despite economic crisis, protests, and the development of a strong and increasingly
united opposition movement, Pinochet held out for his format and timetable, and made it difficult
for any government that followed him to break decisively with his economic policies.”14 Thus,
neoliberalism served the wealthy and excluded the rest, all while continuing to benefit the fading
power of Pinochet, who remained unaccountable for his crimes. It is relevant to note the impact
of negative economic policies as their capitalist tendencies were yet another force which pushed
out progressive political and religious thought. The Church failed to resist these policies as
Cardinal Fresno, Silva’s successor, denied any political or economic affiliation in favor of
centrist placation of the regime. In attempting to wash away the past and move peacefully into
Neoliberalism here refers to the ideology which relies on the free-market and “trickle-down” economics.
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the future, the Church fell short in truly reckoning with the oppression of not only the military
regime, but also the economic policies which it brought. It is worth mentioning that these
policies also benefited the Church, which would, over time, see their congregation change from
majority low income to majority wealthy. Further still, the normalization of neoliberal culture
would ensure the gradual death of Marxist thought and liberation theology. Without spending
money or putting in an excess of effort, the Church was able to sit back and let the democratic
transition shape society into a capitalist venture which benefited them greatly.
The result of this transition towards both neoliberal economics and conservative social
values, some would argue, was the decline of liberation theology in mainstream religious
discussion. Many academics have pondered the question of liberation theology in a modern age
and have struggled with the possibility of a religious movement independent of a Church. It is
clear that the institution has rejected this ideology, but there are many disenfranchised people
across Latin America that have deep spiritual passion, and that suffer greatly. According to
academics such as Judith Soares, this alone is enough to hold optimism for a revival of what
once was a cornerstone of Latin American Catholicism and grassroots organizing.15 However, in
Chile it is important to acknowledge the various barriers that have been put in place both by
politics and the Church in an attempt to steer away from leftist ideologies. The economic policies
are only a small piece of what became an active and direct attempt to exclude the values and
needs of large populations of religious members. Many of these historians and academics have
pointed to democracy as the advent of change in the Church, however this thesis argues that
democracy was a mere tool used by the Church in order to frame their changing value system as
progressive as opposed to regressive, which it certainly was. Pope John Paul II had an affinity to
the Church of the past, before the small allowances of Vatican II allowed for Marxist thought
and advocacy for the impoverished. The Vatican certainly supported a return to hierarchical
structures, especially in Chile, where grassroots activism and the Vicaria had placed much of the
agency in the hands of its members.
Thus, upon the eve of democratic transition, the Chilean Catholic Church adjusted its
narrative to fit its opportunity. They used the liberated government as a way to say goodbye to
any and all forms of oppression, and in doing so reasoned away the need for institutional support
systems like the Vicaria. By ignoring the continuation of unjust living conditions and rampant
poverty, and the disenfranchisement and continued missing status of the desaparecidos, the
Church had set itself up to lose a significant amount of its membership over the next three
decades. While Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno pushed for a Church that took a much more
centrist position against the government, democracy opened doors for a complete move away
from the fascist history of the regime. Instead of dealing with the decades of oppression and
persecution, they chose to turn towards a future with no reconciliation of the past. The Church
advocated for a peaceful transition into a “liberated” democratic society, while still publicly
expressing wariness in regard to democracy’s effect on social society. In addition to the
Judith Soares, “A Future for Liberation Theology?” in Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, no. 20:4 (2008),
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continuing changes from outside the Church, leadership within also made a transition. Upon the
decision of the plebiscite, a conference was held in Punta de Tralca to bring together a
“‘majority’ of ‘conservative’ and ‘moderate’” bishops. They met to decide how the national
Church would adjust to this inauguration of democracy, and also how to best encourage national
reconciliation of the crimes of the dictatorship.16 It was notable that three of the bishops missing
from the conference were well-known progressives, and furthermore the concluding decision
expressed a hope to rely on more “traditional church doctrine,” clearly an attempt to move away
from the leftist antics of their Latin American peers.17 This meeting signals the true mark of
transition. Cardinal Fresno’s power as the conservative archbishop of Santiago may have been
stifled by the international support of the Vicaria, but with the end of the dictatorship came the
opportunity to reframe the Church’s political position. With the introduction of democracy,
conservatives would argue, surely there was no longer a need for an organization which
documents human rights violations. They purposefully reframed the duties of the Vicaria, and
various other local organizing networks, in order to regain the hierarchical approach to power
they had held before Vatican II.
Perhaps one of the key strategies in this moment of transition was the reframing of
human rights as something entirely separate from political alignments. As a general concept, of
course advocacy for human rights is not a position which belongs to any singular political party.
However, the legacy of human rights in Chile, and more broadly in Latin America, was
consistently tied to a leftist struggle against right-wing authoritarian regimes.18 When Cardinal
Fresno took up the mantle of archbishop, he was clear to state “Don’t take me as a rightist or a
leftist, just take me as a pastor who is trying to stress the unity that the Lord asks of us.”19 Thus,
he made clear his position in favor of human rights, and yet also against the politics of liberation
theology. In doing so, he pulled the popularly received human rights advocacy of the Church
away from the leftist ideology of many of its lower ranking clergy and laity. Essentially making
it so his socially conservative views around society and the structural formation of the Church
could stay intact, whilst also not completely abandoning his parishioners to the brutality of the
regime; a political move which would have cause a great deal of international backlash. This
reframing of human rights advocacy from a radical fight to a keeping of the peace was carried on
by Cardinal Cavada in his public calls for forgiveness.
The era where progressive liberation theology shaped Catholic practice was quickly
drawing to a close, and Cardinal Fresno’s time would end even before the Vicaria, as he reached
the age limit of seventy-five in 1990 and handed in his resignation to Pope John Paul II. His
chosen successor was Carlos Oviedo Cavada, a conservative as well, though his character was
certainly much less vibrant. As the archbishop of Santiago in the time directly following a
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military regime, Cavada insisted on “a spirit of forgiveness and understanding.”20 Considering
the brutal torture many civilians underwent, as well as the loved ones who were disappeared, a
“spirit of forgiveness” was a relatively conservative stance to take against the war crimes of a
regime. Furthermore, this is all with the knowledge that Augusto Pinochet would not face human
rights abuse allegations, and instead would continue to serve as commander of the armed forces
until 1998. In this position, Pinochet would purposefully disrupt attempts at human rights trials
against those who had been involved with the regime, and he retained immunity until a fateful
trip to Europe in the late 90s, which put him in a precarious diplomatic position.21 Thus, even in
a democracy, the past trauma of human rights violations was discarded with little healing and no
retribution. Cardinal Cavada’s encouragement of forgiveness and understanding was, for many,
proof that the institution which had once heavily catalogued human rights abuses and their legal
ramifications no longer cared for the pursuit of such justice. Societal trauma following something
as intense as a seventeen-year regime no doubt presented many problems to larger Chilean
society, and yet the dismissal of it by the Church showed a significant lack of urgency and
community-based networking that had once made it a sanctuary to many.

Despite efforts to erase the past, echoes of the
regime remain. This image was taken in the Londres
neighborhood of Santiago, where there was an
infamous detention center. On the street there are
plaques which give the names, ages, and affiliations
of all disappeared there. The paint on the door
reads “Here [there is] torture.”

However, despite Fresno and other leaders’ best efforts to reconcile Church participation
with conservative hierarchical views, Catholic membership was already beginning to decline by
1990. As previously referenced, the closing of the Vicaria in 1992 provides an example of the
extent to which the Church was willing to go to close down community based religious
organizations. The dissolution of the Vicaria can be seen as a landmark for the political transition
of the Church. An organization which had provided sanctuary and legal representation for those
suffering under the regime, as well as catalogued and published human rights violations of the
“Pinochet Reacts to Contreras Court Ruling,” In El Mercurio. Jun 5, 1995.
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government, was suddenly deemed useless in a new democratic era. According to the Church, in
its now changing conservative leadership, the duties of the Vicaria were transferred to that of the
Social Pastorate, a new office that put the Vicaria’s responsibilities exclusively into the hands of
the clergy. This new office was inaugurated by known conservative forces in the Church, most
notably Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno who had previously relinquished his position as
Archbishop of Santiago to Carlos Oviedo Cavada, the man who presented the Pastorate to the
audience.22 The facade of the Pastorate was briefly lived, a feeble attempt to not make the
transition so abrupt. It is widely acknowledged today that the legacy of the Vicaria de
Solidaridad is carried on through its continued archives, the Documentation and Archive
Foundation of the Vicaria de Solidaridad located in a tangential neighborhood of Santiago.23 In
fact, besides the news articles reporting on the inauguration ceremony, there is little to no
information available on the Social Pastorate. Most likely relegated to being a side project of
already busy clergy, the Pastorate quickly faded out of the Church’s main frame.
The Vicaria’s end was a blow to impoverished and struggling communities across
Santiago, but it was certainly not the only factor of this political transition. When Fresno took
office in the 1980s, he stayed fairly distant from the Vicaria itself, as well as other activist
groups, and was publicly vocal concerning his socially conservative views. This was a sign for
many that the Church was quickly becoming closed to the members who had made up its base
structure. Father Francisco Sampedro of the Catholic Church in Santiago spoke of this
development in a news publication, stating “some sectors of the hierarchy do not appreciate the
lay person….”24 This same article pays close attention to the rise of Evangelicalism, specifically
the Pentecostal church, which provides specific roles to members seeking to engage with
community activism. According to the author, “As a result of this activism, which makes them
channel most of their energy towards spiritual betterment, they becomes more responsible and
then they feel more valued by society.”25 The same sense of reasoning can be seen with the
actions of comunidades de base—the base communities for local churches which engage in
spiritual and communal organizing, vigils, support, and resistance.26 These comunidades de base
are few and far between today, but during the time directly before and during the dictatorship
they made up much of the Catholic communities, and undoubtedly provided this sense of
responsibility and value the article underlines. Comunidades de base consisted of neighbors and
families who took action in their own barrios for the protection of their own children, the return
of desaparecidos, security against other militant groups and criminal issues, and the overall
amelioration of their community. When churches needed organizing for holidays, volunteers for
roles such as legal or medical aid, spreading of human rights pamphlets, and the gathering of
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information, the comunidades de base were the on the frontlines. Once the agency of
volunteering and organizing for a cause which benefited their communities was taken from them,
many turned away from the Church. It was not such a direct hit that the Church attendance
immediately plummeted, but over the course of the 1990’s it would become clear to many that
the Church had much different goals and motivations than it had ten years before. Without that
feeling of community and value present, the appeal of regimented Church practices and politics
faded for many Chileans.
Many studies have confirmed this downward trend. In a sociological survey conducted by
Matías Andrés Bargsted and Nicolás De la Cerda, they use political alignment, religious
affiliation, and church attendance as a means through which to measure the trends of political dealignment experienced in Chile in the beginning of the twenty-first century. The research shows
a sustained decline in the Chilean Catholic population, specifically those that attend mass
regularly.27 Another interesting take away from the survey and accompanying analysis is the
downward trend for right-wing Catholics. At first glance, this finding is in tension with an
argument for a rise in Catholic conservatism, but the survey itself does not separate its findings
between Church attending and non-Church attending Catholics, nor does it account for the
general decrease in the population of Chilean Catholics specifically. Thus, this decrease can be
accounted for in the makeup of mass itself, as the changing dynamics of the Church in the 90’s
allowed for much more conservative homilies focused on social morals.28 Therefore, it is still fair
to assume those who actually attend the mass will likely be of a more conservative variety.
Another finding in this research which underlines the centrality of the Catholic Church
specifically, is that the same trends of decrease are not found in the Evangelical community.29 In
fact, as the previous news article mentioned, there has been a continual rise in the Evangelical
community in Chile, and more broadly in Latin America. In the context of this discussion, this is
likely due to the fact that Catholics and Evangelicals do not have the same leadership nor the
same history in the nation of Chile; the guidance of Catholic Church leaders has then found their
Church in a very different situation in the twenty-first century.
Another set of research which documents this decrease in the importance of Catholic life
in Chile is a survey conducted by the World Values Survey. WVS is a network of social
scientists attempting to document changing values within communities, and how those values
impact social lives and perspectives. Their surveys ask questions which range from opinions on
social morals and family life, to involvement in political organizations. In order to track the
value which participants place on various sectors of their life, the surveys functions which a
numerical system; participants use 1 to indicate Very Important, 2 as Rather Important, 3 as Not
Very Important, and 4 as Not At All Important. In the questionnaire from 1990, a large majority
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of participants individually ranked belonging to a human rights group, belonging to a religious
organization, doing unpaid volunteer work for a religious group, and doing unpaid volunteer
work for a human rights group as either 1 or 2 in the set of importance. By the time of the next
questionnaire, in 1996, answers changed drastically. While a large majority still answered that
they were religious, there was a striking decrease in the value with which they placed active
membership to a voluntary religious organization, now marked at an indifferent 3. This change is
only further substantiated by the questionnaire from 2000, which shows a much more diverse set
of responses when participants were asked how often they attend Church.30 In a country once
highly religious, many across the board responded by saying they attended only once a month,
and certainly less than they used to. The downward trajectory exemplified by the World Value
Survey questionnaire continues to support the claim that spiritually and emotionally, Chileans
feel more and more removed from their religious life.

Photo taken at the entrance of the Vicaria de
Solidaridad. Military police hose down civilians
attempting to enter the Vicaria. Circa 1980.

Photo taken at the entrance of what is today the
offices of the Archdiocese. There is a plaque on the
wall that pays tribute to the Vicaria, and where the
fire truck once was stands a statue of Cardinal Silva .
2019.

We are attempting to understand the motivations the Catholic Church had in Chile to
transition political alignments, especially when the result of such an action would directly lead to
a decrease in Church membership and participation. Various authors have argued for
democracy’s power in such a moment and have pointed to political change as a catalyst for
religious change.31 However, this thesis argues that the transition to democracy was instead used
as a tool through which the Church was able to complete their return to hierarchical power
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structures and conservative social morals. The question of why they would go through with such
an abrupt change can be traced back to power; John Paul II’s stricter Vatican and Cardinal
Fresno’s placation of the regime all point towards a desire within the leadership of the Catholic
Church to return to a time before Marxist meddling and the introduction of liberation theology.
This desire was balanced on the misreading of liberation theology, and its influences such as
grassroots organizing and the Vicaria de Solidaridad, as a threat to the control of the Church.
Instead of acknowledging the vast participation and active membership of the Chilean
population, especially in Santiago, the Church felt it did not exercise enough control over the
social and cultural aspects of citizen life. Furthermore, they underestimated low-income
Chileans’ belief in resistant institutions such as the Vicaria, and their continued abuse by the
economic systems of neoliberal democracy. The Church put its faith in democratic promises of
liberation and excess, and continued to harbor negative sentiments towards the ideologies of
Marxism which advocated for the dissolution of religious institutions. It is likely that they did
not realize the consequence of changing political alignments and religious routine would have
such a negative impact on Catholic Church attendance and the popularity of spiritual life. There
are many remaining questions which inquire too deep for us to speculate, such as why these
consequences were unforeseen, and how removed the clerical bodies were from impoverished
living. However, it is true that many priests and clergy in impoverished areas remained dedicated
to their communities in spite of the directions of the larger national church. A prime example
would be Padre Mariano Puga, who continued for decades after the regime to promote liberation
theology and advocacy for the poor. Still, it was difficult to live or organize in a certain way so
unsupported by the institution one belongs to, and thus many of these communities continue to
fade out of history. The eventual move into the Concertacion government at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, would turn eyes towards larger national problems, and time would take its
toll on the many poor, religious communities of Santiago.32

32

The Concertacion government refers here mostly to the presidency of Michelle Bachelet, beginning in 2006, and
the ensuing educational and social protests.
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